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NOTES
A Free Press and a Fair Trial: England v.
The United States
The liberty of the press is no greater and no less than the liberty of
every subject of the Queen. ENGLAND
In the borderline instances where it is difficult to say upon which side
the alleged offense falls, we think the specific freedom of public com-
ment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence
pending cases. THE UNITED STATES2
In England the free press bows only to the rights of one accused of a
crime.' In the United States the free press, backed by a written constitu-
tion, has insisted upon and has achieved a preferred status, even when
scrutinizing an embattled accused and knowingly dedicated to his
jeopardy.4 Such a stand, when occasionally urged by an English news-
paperman, is promptly punished by contempt of court, by fine or im-
prisonment.5 But such a contempt power directed toward journalists
is absent in the United States, and although it may properly be yearned
for, frequently, in the face of gross abuse, such yearnings are sup-
pressed by law and mortgaged to our historic and peculiar constitutional
preference for free speech and a free press.6 Thus, he who is accused of
an obnoxious crime in the United States must, almost as a matter of
course, endure the unhappy fate of scrutiny by the press. It is the added
burden of any accused, whether guilty or innocent. The newspapers, of
course, do not have to pay for the exercise of their rare privilege to know
and to speak.' This note will examine the payment made by the accused
for our right to a free press and consider the English power of contempt.
1. Regina v. Gray, [1900) 2 Q.B. 36, 40.
2. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946).
3. Rex v. Editor of the "Surrey Comet," 75 SOL. J. 311, 312 (K.B., C-A. 1931).
4. Pennekampv. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946).
5. Rex v. Editor of the "Daily Herald," 75 SoL. J. 119 (K.B. 1931); Rex. v. Editor of the
"Evening Standard," 40 T.L.R. 833 (K.B. 1924).
6. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946); 1 MADISON, ANNALS OF CONGRESS,
1789-1790 434 (1834).
7. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1952); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
8. None of the contempt citations have been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States since Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1917), was overruled by
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1940). See also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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THE ENGLISH COURTS AND THE POWER OF CONTEMPT
The Nature of the Contempt Power
The English courts have discouraged "trials" outside of the courtroom
by retaining the power to punish, as contempt, conduct having any ten-
dency whatsoever to affect or prejudice judicial proceedings.' Such con-
duct as applied to newspapers means the publication before trial of any
statement as to possible guilt or any comment concerning alleged evi-
dence,"° and the publication during trial of any comment concerning
other than the record of admitted evidence:"
In the article complained of there was a long account, carefully got to-
gether, which included at least three statements of grave prejudice
against the man who afterwards was charged. A newspaper was
entitled to report, fairly and accurately, what took place in open court,
but, in the present case, ex concessio, nothing had taken place in court,
and there was no question of reporting proceedings in court. The news-
paper had busied itself in the deplorable enterprise of collecting ma-
terials which might be thought to be of interest concerning that which
9. Rex v. Davies, [1906] 1 K.B. 32, 35 (1905); Rex. v. Parke, [1903] 2 K.B. 432, 436,
437.
10. Pre-trial newspaper commentary is considered by the English courts as a greater danger to
securing a fair trial than is commentary during or after trial. Rex v. Editor of the "Surrey
Comet," 70 SOL. J. 311 (K.B., C.A. 1931). The cases on pre-trial newspaper comment in
which contempt citations were upheld are collected here in summary fashion:
A newspaper published statements to the effect that a woman, then under arrest on a charge
of abandoning a child, had practiced wholesale baby farming and had previously been convicted
of fraud. For making these statements the newspaper was convicted of contempt and fined
100 pounds though the woman was eventually committed to trial for attempted child murder.
Rex v. Davies, [1906] 1 K.B. 32 (1905). Likewise a citation for contempt and a fine of 220
pounds were upheld against a newspaper which had stated that a certain party had confessed
to having killed his wife, but had denied the act was murder. At the time of publication the
party was being held in custody but had not yet been formally charged. The court said: "After
the man was in custody the newspaper commented upon the case as to whether he had com-
mitted the crime, not to assist in unravelling the case. It was merely an attempt to minister to
the idle curiosity of the people as to what was passing within the prison before the trial took
place...." Rex v. Clark, 27 T.L.R. 32 (K.B. 1910).
In another case where a newspaper had actually sent amateur detectives to investigate a
killing and had published what was uncovered by the detectives after a charge of murder had
been made and the time of trial set, the court levied a fine of 1000 pounds. Rex v. Editor of
the "Evening Standard," 40 T.L.R. 833 (K.B. 1924).
A contempt conviction was sustained in another instance for the publication of a poster
containing the words "Another Blazing Car Murder," which in fact related to a separate case,
at a time when an accused stood committed for trial on the charge of murdering a man found
in a gutted car. Rex v. Editor of the "Daily Herald," 75 SOL. J. 119 (K.B. 1931). And again,
the court held that the publication of a photograph calculated to prejudice a fair trial was an ac-
tion just as susceptible to a citation for contempt as any prejudicial narrative. Rex v. "Daily
Mirror," [1927] 1 K.B. 845. Finally, prior to the actual prosecution of Haigh, the so-called
Bluebeard, at a time when the defendant had been formally charged with only one murder, the
Daily Mirror, in banner headlines, accused him of being a vampire, of having murdered other
persons, giving the names of these persons, as well as a description of how these murders were
carried out. In this instance the court fined the newspaper 10,000 pounds and sentenced the
editor to three months in prison. The Prosecution of Haigh, The Times (London), March
26, 1949, p. 3, col. 1.
11. Rex v. Astor, 30 T.L.R. 10 (K.B. 1913); Rex v. Tibbits [1902] 1 K.B. 77 (1901).
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had been done and the person who, it was expected, would be accused.
Once a newspaper departed from a fair and accurate report of what was
actually stated in open court it not only took a great risk itself, but it also
imperiled the unfortunate man, guilty or innocent, who was charged.
For what had been done in the present case there was no conceivable
excuse.
12
So too, comment on the weight of evidence during trial will invite a cita-
tion for contempt.'3 Moreover, there is some risk encountered by the
journalist who writes unwisely even after trial, especially if an appeal is
pending. 4 Nor are the contempt citations to be considered anything but
serious and effective punishment, for an offending reporter, editor, or
even publisher may very well pay a 10,000 pound fine and find himself
in jail for three months.'5
In Rex v. Parke,'6 Justice Wills, referring to a pre-trial newspaper
article which recounted a history of the accused's prior conviction, stated
a rationale for the English attitude:
The reason why the publication of articles like those with which we
have to deal is treated as a contempt of court is because their tendency
and sometimes their object is to deprive the court of the power of doing
that which is the end for which it exists - namely, to administer justice
duly, impartially, and with reference solely to the facts judicially brought
before it. Their tendency is to reduce the court which has to try the
case to impotence, so far as the effectual elimination of prejudice and
prepossession is concerned.17
The depth of the English court's concern, in this respect, especially in
12. Rex. v. Editor of the "Surrey Comet," 75 SOL. J. 311 (K.B., A.C. 1931).
13. Rex v. Hammond & Co., [1914] 2 K.B. 866.
14. In Rex v. Parke [1903) 2 K.B. 432, the court held that the contempt power could be
used to prevent comment on matters concerning litigation already terminated at the time of
publication, on the theory that should the criticism be adverse to the decision, it would make
it more difficult for the court to decide future cases of a similar nature as well as have a ten-
dency to degrade the court in the public eye. However, there are no such cases expressly using
the contempt power to punish for post-trial comment. Thus in a case wherein a newspaper was
charged with contempt for publishing articles in which one Hobbs had been called a "wizard
crook" after he had been convicted, the court held that since the articles were calculated only
to prejudice the fair hearing on appeal rather than on trial, they did not come within the law
of contempt Rex v. Editor of the "People," The Times (London), April 7, 1925, p. 5, col. 4
(K.B.). Thus the earlier case of Rex v. Parke, supra, would seem to be overruled but for some
more recent dictum in a case in which a newspaper published information concerning a party
convicted of procuring a miscarriage. These articles were published after conviction and after
notice of appeal. The court indicated that merely because a trial has ended a newspaper is not
granted blanket immunity. In this case although the newspaper did not suffer a contempt
citation, one of the justices commented: "Why... should a judge be embarrassed by having
matters put into his mind the effect of which it is impossible to estimate or assess? Obviously,
far less would amount to a contempt of court if the matter were published before the hearing
by a jury than would be required before hearing by a judge or by a court of criminal appeal.'
Rex v. Davies, [1945] 1 KB. 535. An English editor who authorizes publication of par-
ticularly abusive post-trial commentary may some day make this dictum law.
15. The Prosecution of Haigh, The Times (London), March 26, 1949, p. 3, col. 1.
16. [1903] 2 K.B. 432.
17. Id. at 436-37.
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regard to a possible prejudicial effect upon a jury, was made clear when,
in Rex. v. Tibbets,'8 the court cited a newspaper for contempt for publica-
tion of matter tending to prejudice a jury in a pending proceeding and
held that it was not necessary to show that the jury had actually read the
article, but only that it had been made public and that jurors had had
access to it. And in Rex v. Davies,19 Justice Humphreys completed the
circle with a final practical justification:
I think it is a fallacy to say or to assume that the presiding judge is a
person who cannot be affected by outside information. He is a human
being, and while I do not suggest that it is likely that any judge, as the
result of information which had been improperly conveyed to him, would
give a decision which otherwise he would not have given, it is em-
barrassing to a judge that he should be informed of matters which he
would much rather not hear and which make it much more difficult for
him to do his duty.20
Fines, Imprisonment, Apology
The power of the English court's contempt weapon can be witnessed
in the court's willingness to add a sentence of imprisonment to a fine
levied against a reporter, an editor, or even a publisher:
[H]is Lordship added that, so long as they sat there, they were deter-
mined that trial by newspaper would not be substituted for trial by jury.
The primary punishment in a case of this kind was imprisonment. The
Court could not be blind to the fact that newspapers were frequently
owned by wealthy people who would take their chance and cheerfully
pay any fines that might be inflicted for the sake of the advertisement. If
this practice was not stopped the Court would have to inflict the
primary punishment.2 '
Apology by the offending newspaper, however, can sometimes mitigate
the punishment, but only when the court is convinced of good faith and
the injury is believed to be meager.22 Under these circumstances an
apology will suspend costs or even a fine. 8 In other cases, when the
court doubts the sincerity of an apology, such a maneuver is without ef-
fect and might even tend to antagonize the court.2 4 One case even con-
sidered the apology to the court as without significance in spite of histori-
cal precedent: "The apology was due to the people wronged and to the
public. The Court had no feeling in regard to the matter."25  In this
case the fine and costs of the contempt were sustained.
18. [1902] 1 K.B. 77 (1901).
19. [1945) 1 K.B. 435.
20. Id. at 442-43.
21. Rex v. Clarke, 27 T.L.R. 32, 35 (K.B. 1910).
22. Rex v. Hutchinson [1936] 2 All Eng. 1514 (K.B.).
23. Ibid.
24. Rex v. Hammond & Co., [1914] 2 K.B. 866.
25. Rex v. Clarke, 27 T.L.R. 32, 35 (K.B. 1910).
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In Rex v. Haigh2" the editor and publisher were called before the
court for having charged in their newspaper that Haigh, the so-called
Bluebeard, had committed several murders although at the time of publi-
cation he had been charged with only one murder. There was an apology,
but
in view of the gravity of the case the Court had ordered the proprietors
of the newspaper to be brought before the Court. He [the Court]
would add a word of warning: Let the directors beware; they knew
now the conduct of which their employees were capable, and the view
which the court took of the matter. If for the purpose of increasing
circulation of their paper they should venture to publish such matter
as this, the directors themselves might find that the arm of that Court
was long enough to reach them and to deal with them individually.
The Court had taken the view that there must be severe punishment.
His Lordship then called on Mr. Bolanto [the editor] to stand up,
and, addressing him said: "The writ of attachment will be issued, and
you will be taken in the custody of the tipstaff and committed to Brixton
Prison for three calendar months."
Continuing, his Lordship said that the respondent company would
be fined 10,000 [pounds] and pay costs of the proceedings.2
Contrast Between the English and American Exercise
of the Power of Contempt
In England the contempt power is used by the courts as a preventive
measure, the object being to stop altogether abuses by the press that
might in any way imperil the fate of an accused.23 In the United States,
the accused, and even the court itself, must accept with resignation the
sensationalism of the press, for there is no effective means of controlling
it."9 The constructive contempt power directed by the courts in the
United States against the free press has been rendered impotent by judi-
cial decision. 0 The only remedy for such abuse in America is corrective
rather than preventive. It is a post-trial remedy. It is the right of one
who has been convicted to appeal on grounds that his trial was influenced
prejudicially by newspaper commentary. 1 Although this remedy does
not much insulate a court or jury from the pressures of newspaper intimi-
dation or insult," it can bring a comfort to the accused himself. Occa-
sionally a conviction is reversed because of prejudicial newspaper com-
mentary.83
26. The Times (London), March 26, 1949, p. 3, col. 1.
27. Ibid.
28. Rex v. Parke, [1903] 2 KB. 432, 436.
29. See discussion concerning Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), p. 154 infra.
30. Ibid.
31. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
32. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
33. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
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An impressive difference between these two attitudes regarding a free
press was demonstrated in 1957, when Dr. John Adams was brought to
trial at Old Bailey in London.34 He was charged with the murder of
elderly patients through the excessive administration of drugs. The
American press printed pictures of the Doctor together with pictures of
various of his deceased patients. There was much detailed speculation.
Dr. Adams was caricatured as a cunning old murderer out to make him-
self heir to his elderly patients. Conviction, it was implied, would be a
mere formality. There was, however, no such comment in the British
press, and Dr. Adams was acquitted by a jury after a deliberation of
forty-five minutes.35 Thus the presumption of the American press was
not the fact of the English jury's decision.
THE CONTEMPT POWER IN THE UNITED STATES
Origins and History
The English common-law view that courts have the power to punish,
as contempt, conduct having any tendency whatsoever to affect or preju-
dice judicial proceedings was carried over into the American federal
courts by the Act of September 24, 1789:36
Courts of the United States shall have power .. to punish by fine or
imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of au-
thority in any cause or hearing before same.37
Abuses resulted from this discretionary contempt power given to the
courts, and the issue demanded a new appraisal after the celebrated im-
peachment trial of Judge James Peck.38 Judge Peck had disbarred and
imprisoned an attorney named Lawless for having published an adverse
comment on a decision which the judge had made against him and
from which an appeal was pending at the time of the publication. Al-
though Judge Peck was acquitted, public sentiment against the severity
of his action led to new legislation limiting the contempt power of the
courts.3 9 By the Act of March 2, 183140 the summary punishment of
contempt could only be directed against misconduct committed "in the
presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice." Some four years later the statute was given judicial
interpretation. In Ex parte Poulson41 it was held that the federal courts
34. Life, April 22, 1957, pp. 53-55.
35. Ibid.
36. 1 Stat. 73.
37. 1 Stat. 83.
38. STANSBURY, TRIAL OF JAMEs H. PEcK (1833).
39. Ibid.
40. 4 Stat. 487.
41. 19 Fed Cas. 1205 (No. 11,350) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1835).
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could not punish as contempt the publication of an article allegedly di-
rected against the process of a pending trial, for the statute embraced only
such misbehavior as occurred in or near the immediate vicinity of the
court. Thus by 1835 the English position on contempt powers had been
repudiated in America, and newspapers could do what they pleased about
trial reporting.
During the First World War, however, in Toledo Newspaper Com-
pany v. United States, an attempt was made to return to the courts a
more effective power of contempt. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that the publication of adverse comment on a pending case
by a newspaper was punishable as contempt if the article had a "reason-
able tendency" to prejudice the rights of an accused. The federal statute
was thus given a causal rather than a geographical interpretation. Courts
could now punish as contempt activity which interfered with the adminis-
tration of the court's business, even though the activity was not com-
mitted in the physical presence of the court. This interpretation of the
contempt statute was, however, rejected by the Court in a case decided in
1940. In Nye v. United States,43 the Court reverted to the position which
had been taken by a lower federal court in Poulson44 in 1835, and held
that only that misconduct which had been committed "geographically
proximate" to the court could be punished as contempt.
Although these decisions at first governed only federal courts, it must
be recalled that Gitlow v. New York45 recognized that the guarantees of
free expression found in the first amendment were also applicable
through the fourteenth amendment as limitations on the states, and that
the contempt power exercised by state courts, in this regard, could be
no greater than that of federal courts.
The Preferred Position of Freedom of the Press
In Bridges v. California48 the Supreme Court of the United States
heard two separate cases, each having a labor background and each in-
volving a contempt citation. In one case a California court had cited a
newspaper for contempt for having stated in an editorial entitled "Pro-
bation for Gorillas,"47 that the defendants, two union organizers, should
be denied probation and that the judge, were he to grant probation, would
be making a serious mistake. In the other case, a labor leader was con-
42. 247 U.S. 402 (1917).
43. 313 U.S. 33 (1940).
44. Ex parte Poulson, 19 Fed. Cas. 1205 (No. 11,350) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1835).
45. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
46. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
47. The text of this Los Angeles Times editorial of May 5, 1938 may be found in the Court's
footnotes. 314 U.S. 272 n. 17.
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victed of contempt for having published a telegram sent by him to the
Secretary of Labor denouncing a decision rendered by a judge of a state
court as "outrageous" and threatening a general strike which would tie
up the ports of the Pacific coast. For the first time the Court introduced
the clear and present danger test into the contempt area. Both cases were
reversed. The Court held that publication is not to be denied the consti-
tutional protection of a free press merely because it concerns a judicial
proceeding still pending in the courts. Only if the evils emerging from
indiscriminate publications are extremely serious and the degree of immi-
nence extremely high will a contempt citation be sustained. Specifically,
the Court felt that there was no clear and present danger involved in the
first case because the newspaper involved was anti-labor and it was
therefore only natural that a judge considering granting probation to
these union members would come under some form of attack. In other
words, because under these circumstances the editorial comment might
have been expected, there was no clear and present danger. In the second
case, the Court felt that the threat of a general strike could not be con-
sidered as such intimidation of the court as to amount to contempt, for
strikes, not being illegal, could not be considered a clear and present
danger.
In Pennekamp v. Florida,4" the appearance of newspaper editorials in-
timating bias on the part of the court toward those who were charged
with crime resulted in a citation for contempt. The Supreme Court of
the United States reversed, concluding "that the danger under this record
to fair judicial administration had not the clearness and immediacy neces-
sary to close the door of permissible public comment."49  More impor-
tant, however, were the remarks of Justice Reed who, writing for the
majority, stated succinctly the position at which the Court has now ar-
rived. This statement reveals the unarticulated rationale behind the deci-
sions which have been handed down from the time of the trial of Judge
Peck and the Act of March 2, 1831, when the common law of contempt
was first limited in this country." It undoubtedly represents the ration-
ale upon which the clear and present danger test rests, as applied to the
contempt power, and it suggests that perhaps the clear and present dan-
ger formula is more a means to an end than it is an actual test. In a
sentence Justice Reed has stated the American position:
In the borderline instances where it is difficult to say upon which side
the alleged offense falls, we think the specific freedom of public com-
ment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence
pending cases.51
48. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
49. Id. at 350.
50. See notes 38, 40, and 41 supra and accompanying text.
51. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946).
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There are two other notable contempt cases which were considered
by the Supreme Court. In Craig v. Harney52 the clear and present danger
test was again followed, the Court reversing a contempt citation on the
ground that the newspaper commentary in question had fallen "far shore'
of meeting that test. In Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show the Court
refused to review a case in which a contempt citation against a broadcast-
ing company had been dismissed by a state appellate court."' The cita-
tion had originally been issued because of inflammatory radio broadcasts
directed against a man accused of murdering a child. Justice Frankfurter
wrote a long and unusual opinion respecting the denial, by the Court, of
the petition for the writ of certiorari. In it he indicated that a denial of
the writ of certiorari means nothing more than that fewer than four mem-
bers of the Court deem it desirable to hear a case, and that an inference
as to the merits cannot be taken from such a denial. In other words he
was insistent on showing that the denial of the writ in Baltimore Radio
Show did not mean that the Court necessarily approved the dismissal of
the contempt citation by the state appellate court. Then, demonstrating
his antipathy for trial by newspaper, he added: "Proceedings for the
determination of guilt or innocence in open court before a jury are not in
competition with other means for establishing the charge."55  This is
the latest pronouncement by a member of the Court on the contempt
question." It does not even rise to the level of dictum and must be
considered as a personal remark of Justice Frankfurter who, it should
be remembered, dissented in the Bridges case. 7 The rule in Pennekamp,
giving the free press a preferred position, appears to be the law with
regard to the exercise of the power of contempt by American courts.
THE AMERICAN ABUSE OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The Scotsboro Boys,58 Bruno Richard Hauptmann,59 Sam Sheppard,"
and many others have endured a kind of fame by virtue of being tried for
52. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
53. 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
54. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 133 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
55. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950).
56. But see, Sheppard v. Ohio, 352 U.S. 910 (1956).
57. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 279 (1941). Justice Frankfurter's concurring opin-
ion in PennekamAp, 328 U.S. 331, 350 (1946), sets out at length his views on the constitu-
tional issues presented in the contempt cases.
58. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
See also HAYS, TRIAL BY PREJUDICE (1935); PAT=ERSON & CONRAD, SCOTSBORO BOY
(1950).
59. Hauptmann v. New Jersey, 296 U.S. 649 (1935). See also the remarks of Florence .
Allen in Fair TriL and Free Press: No Fundamental Clash Between the Two, 41 A.B.A.J. 897
(1955).
60. Sheppard v. Ohio, 352 U.S. 910 (1956). See also Brucker, Journalism by Lawyers, 29
CONN. B.J. 40, 47 (1955).
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obnoxious crimes in the glare of nationwide publicity. These defendants,
and many others burdened with a similar fate, came to reside in prison,
and thereafter were soon largely forgotten by the press. If in such cases
the activities of the free press have been prejudical to the defendant,6 he
has nevertheless been denied legal redress for the free press has been
given a preferred position and virtual immunity from the contempt
process." It is true that he who is thus convicted does have the right to an
appeal on the ground that a fair hearing was denied him.63 But standing
alone, this is a desperate remedy.
In Shepherd v. Florida4 the Supreme Court of the United States re-
versed the convictions of several Negroes sentenced to death for rape.
Newspapers published as fact information that the defendants had con-
fessed. Witnesses and jurors admitted having heard of the confession.
No confession was ever introduced during the trial. While the trial was
61. There does not seem to be any doubt in the minds of the newspaper people themselves
concerning their power and influence in regard to a judge and jury. In Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367 (1947), a local newspaper admitted to having unfairly reported the facts of a civil
case and to having castigated the judge, yet the conviction of contempt was reversed by the
Court. However, Justice Jackson in his dissent, supra at 394, 397, probed the issue and in-
dicated the feelings of the press in this regard:
"From our sheltered position, fortified by life tenure and other defenses to judicial inde-
pendence, it is easy to say that this local judge ought to have shown more fortitude in the face
of criticism. But he had no such protection. He was an elective judge, who held for a short
term. I do not take it that an ambition of a judge to remain a judge is either unusual or dis-
honorable ...
"It is doubtful if the press itself regards judges as so insulated from public opinion. In
this very case the American Newspaper Publisher Association filed a brief amicus curiae on
the merits after we granted certiorari. Of course, it does not cite a single authority that was
not available to counsel for the publisher involved, and does not tell us a single new fact except
this one: 'This membership embraces more than 700 newspaper publishers whose publications
represent in excess of eighty percent of the total daily and Sunday circulation of newspapers
published in this country. The Association is vitally interested in the issue presented in this
case, namely, the right of newspapers to publish news stories and editorials on cases pending
in the courts.'
"This might be a good occasion to demonstrate the fortitude of the judiciary."
Such fortitude was not, however, demonstrated.
Judge Learned Hand has grappled with the same problem of newspaper influence, particu-
larly with regard to the jury:
"I do not know how much jurors are influenced by what they read in newspapers. If
anyone tells you that he knows, I would cross examine him, for I feel quite sure that he does
not. From the little I have gathered out of conversations with jurors after the event, it does
not seem to me that their verdicts are determined, as in theory they should be, only by what
they hear in court. As you probably know, in France there is little or no effort to select what
the jury shall hear; practically everything goes before them. Perhaps that is the better way.
What I said to you the other night was based upon what has been our system of law for about
300 years, involving a very strict screening of what shall go before the jury. Whether this
has been successful or not would be very difficult to say; and the fact that I agree with it may
be no more than an occupational disease." Quoted by Herbert Brucker in Journalism by Law-
yers, 29 CoNN. B.J. 40, 46 (1955).
62. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
63. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
64. 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
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in progress a mob forced the Negro community to abandon their homes,
and the National Guard had to be called in. Inflammatory articles ap-
peared continually in the newspapers chronicling those events. An edi-
torial cartoon was published picturing several electric chairs and carrying
the title, "No Compromise - Supreme Penalty." A postponement and
a change of venue were denied. The Court reversed the convictions on
the ground that a Negro is denied the equal protection of the law when
he is indicted by a grand jury from which Negroes as a race have been
intentionally excluded. Only two of the Justices, Frankfurter and Jack-
son,65 believed that a fair trial was denied because of the publication of
the alleged confession and because of the inflammatory articles appearing
in the press.
In Stroble v. California68 the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to death. Prior to the trial and while the defend-
ant was in the act of making a confession to a stenographer the District
Attorney released to the press the details of the confession and also an-
nounced his belief that the defendant was guilty and sane. The Court af-
firmed the conviction on the ground that the confession was voluntary
and that there was sufficient other evidence to support a conviction.
Frankfurter dissented67 on the ground that the lower court had affirma-
tively sanctioned newspaper participation as an inevitable ingredient of
American criminal justice.
In Marshall v. United States68 the defendant was convicted of unlaw-
fully dispensing a certain drug. The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the conviction on the ground that newspaper accounts as to the
illegal practice of medicine by the defendant had reached the jurors, and
that this information was of a character which the trial judge himself had
ruled as being so prejudicial that it could not be directly offered as evi-
dence.
Finally, in the more recent case of Irvin v. Dowd" the Court refused
to uphold a murder conviction and a death sentence on the ground that
the jury had been prejudicially influenced prior to trial by inflammatory
newspaper articles. Initially there was a change of venue to a county
adjoining that in which the crime was committed. But newspapers which
were delivered regularly to approximately ninety-five per cent of the
dwellings in this second county, where the accused was actually tried, car-
ried accounts of the accused's past criminal record and reported that he
had confessed to the six murders involved. They reported that the ac-
65. Id. at 50 (concurring opinion).
66. 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
67. Id. at 198.
68. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
69. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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cused had offered to plead guilty if promised a ninety-nine year sentence,
but that this offer had been rejected by the prosecutor who was deter-
mined to secure the death penalty. One story documented the promise
of a sheriff of a neighboring state to devote his life to securing the con-
viction of the accused, for the murders allegedly committed in his state,
if the present trial resulted in acquittal. Another newspaper reported
that the only reason that the accused's attorney had agreed to act as coun-
sel in the case was because he would be subject to disbarment if he had
refused such representation. Four-hundred and thirty persons were called
as prospective jurors; three-hundred and seventy of them, or ninety per-
cent, admitted that they entertained some opinion as to the accused's
guilt. More important, however, was the fact that eight out of the twelve
persons eventually seated as jurors had admitted during the voir dire ex-
amination that they actually believed the accused to be guilty of murder.
A second change of venue was denied. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed this conviction:
With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be
tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion
and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of the members admit,
before hearing any testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt °O
So, an accused can be rescued from the newspapers by an American
court.
7 1
CONCLUSION
Prior to the enactment of the Bill of Rights, James Madison, then
preparing a draft of the first amendment, wrote:
Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom
of the press, or liberty of conscience come in question in that body
[Parliament], the invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their
Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security of
those rights, respecting which the people of America are most alarmed.
The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privi-
leges of the people, are unguarded in the British Constitution.72 (Em-
phasis added.)
These "choicest privileges of the people" are guarded in our Constitution
and, as Madison later said, "the state of the press.., under the common
law, cannot be the standard of its freedom in the United States.""3 If the
historic forces burdening the drafter of the Bill of Rights resulted in a
preference, on his part, for the freedom of the press over other great
rights, it is not surprising that the preference persists today, and that our free
70. Id. at 728.
71. See also Janko v. United States, 366 U.S. 716 (1961).
72. 1 MADISON, ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 1789-1790 434 (1834).
73. 6 MADISON, WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802 387 (1910).
[VOL 13:1
Free Press and Fair Trial
press is different from the free press of the British. Madison recognized
that although there was no written constitution in Britain, advocates did
appear to resist any invasion of fundamental rights. Nor today is the
freedom of the British press anywhere denied. Yet an accused in Britain
does not have to submit to the scrutiny of untutored publicity. It is not
that the British press is so much restricted in this regard; rather it can be
considered to have learned the rules of evidence. The American press,
on the other hand, has not shown itself willing to accept such an educa-
tion. And the result is that in America the accused is compelled to suffer
the risks of publicity.
Various remedies, aside from the classic exercise of the power of con-
tempt, have occasionally been suggested to thwart this abuse by the press.
These include: change of venue, new trial, voluntary action by the press,
closer cooperation between bar associations and the press, a more effective
Canon 20, and a general restriction on disclosure of information emerg-
ing from the various officers and personnel of the courts.7" For the most
part, such remedies have proved to be ineffectual, a fact evidenced by the
kind of prejudicial trial reporting appearing daily in the press. They
have not mitigated the abuse. Moreover, it would seem that such reme-
dies will continue to be ineffective while the implements of public per-
suasion constantly gain in power and influence in a crowding and com-
peting world and while judges are compelled to believe that "the specific
power of public comment should weigh heavily against a possible ten-
dency to influence pending cases.""5 Yet the exercise of the constructive
contempt power in England has cured the abuse in that country. Of all
the remedies volunteered, it is the only one that has been proved
successful.
The authority of success compels attention. In England an accused
is protected from abuses by the press through the power of contempt, be-
cause the English courts believe that "the liberty of the press is no greater
and no less than the liberty of every subject of the Queen."7  Yet the
English press remains free.
It would seem unrealistic to presume that the constructive contempt
power could be readily rehabilitated or sustained in the United States.
Yet the power to discover, cite, and uphold a contempt, although dor-
mant, still exists. It can emerge only when a clear and present danger
74. See generally, Note, 63 HARv. L. REV. 840 (1949), for an evaluation of these remedies.
See also Bell, A Problem in Legal Ethics: Fair Trial, 31-32 J.S.B.A. CAL. 212, 222-25
(1956-57), for a good discussion of the weaknesses in Canon 20 of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Canons of Professional Ethics.
75. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946).
76. Regina v. Gray, £19001 2 Q.B. 56, 40.
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is apprehended by a resolute judge.7 The lower courts, being closer to
the abuse, are not always reluctant to find a contempt by the press, yet
such findings, presently, become feeble gestures, for the citations are not
upheld on appeal to our highest Court.78 That this has been the fate of
the contempt citation is well appreciated and encouraged by the press,79
and it is thus not surprising that the members of the press believe that
the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Constitution is an absolute
freedom.8" Yet the composition of the Supreme Court of the United
States changes, and so could that Court's attitude in regard to the exercise
of the power of contempt when confronted by an aggravated abuse by
the press. If suddenly a citation for contempt were to be upheld by the
Court on the ground of a clear and present danger, would not the right
of an accused to a fair trial, in this instance at least, become equated with
and no longer subordinate to the rights enjoyed by the free press? Would
not a new trial become mandatory? Would not all doubt as to the fair-
ness of this particular trial in regard to the prejudice created by news-
papers be permanently removed? Would the equation of two great
rights necessarily have to be considered as an infringement by the one
upon the other?
Justices Holmes and Frankfurter, in particular, have concerned them-
selves with freedom of speech and freedom of the press.81 Each has at-
tempted to increase the magnitude of these rights, yet each has compre-
hended limitations upon them. Holmes, if any one, increased the di-
mensions of freedom of speech, yet he early indicated the necessity of
basic restriction.83 Frankfurter, following in the areas staked out by
Holmes, has made freedom of the press and a fair trial his special con-
cern. He has quipped:
In securing freedom of speech, the Constitution hardly meant to create
the right to influence judges or juries. That is no more freedom of
speech than stuffing a ballot box is an exercise of the right to vote. .... 84
And probed:
If guilt .. . is dear, the dignity of the law would be best enhanced by
establishing that guilt wholly through the processes of law unaided by
77. Craig v. Harney, 351 U.S. 367 (1947); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1940).
78. Ibid.
79. See note 61 supra.
80. See generally Brucker, Free Trial v. Free Press, 20 TEX. B. J. 438 (1957); Smith, Fair
Trial and Free Press: Pressure Exerted on Courts and Jurors, 42 A.B.A.J. 341 (1956); Brucker,
Journalism by Lawyers, 29 CONN. B.J. 40 (1955).
81. See Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
82. Ibid.
83. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
84. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 366 (1946).
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